A Year of Accidents in Transport: Thailand's Ministry Takes Action
Source - Bangkok Biz News Online
Monday, December 30, 2024 07:03
This article revisits 5 transport-related accidents in 2024 that led to a new "containment" policy. The Ministry of Transport is expediting the creation of a "pocketbook" to raise safety standards and increase penalties for contractors who endanger the public. Offenders may face blacklisting and future bidding bans.
In 2024, the Ministry of Transport focused on infrastructure construction to enhance national capabilities and improve public transportation. Numerous rail projects were underway across the country, including mass transit lines, high-speed rail, and double-track railway projects.
Despite safety measures, unexpected accidents occurred within the Ministry's projects. Bangkok Biz News has compiled these incidents, which serve as lessons for stricter safety supervision in transport-related projects.
1. Yellow Line Train Wheel Detachment
On January 2, 2024, a wheel detached from a Yellow Line train, damaging a taxi on Thepharak Road before reaching Sri Thepha Station in Samut Prakan province. Fortunately, there were no injuries. Investigations revealed that a damaged bearing in the guide wheel caused the detachment.
2. Yellow Line Train Power Rail Incident
On March 28, 2024, a finger plate at an expansion joint on the Yellow Line shifted, striking and dislodging the power rail between Khlanthai (YL12) and Sri Udom (YL16) stations. This damaged two cars and a motorcycle, but no one was injured.
3. Landslide in Thai-Chinese High-Speed Rail Tunnel
On August 24, 2024, at 11:40 PM, a landslide occurred within the Khlong Phai railway tunnel in Pak Chong district, Nakhon Ratchasima province. This tunnel is part of the Thai-Chinese high-speed rail project's first phase (Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima). Three workers were trapped inside.
4. School Bus Fire
On October 1, 2024, a tragic fire engulfed a school bus from Wat Khao Phraya Sangkharam School in Uthai Thani province, resulting in 23 deaths (20 students and 3 teachers). The cause was a gas leak at the front of the bus, which had 11 gas tanks installed despite registering only 6. This highlighted a failure in vehicle inspection standards.
5. Concrete Beam and Crane Collapse on Rama II Road
On November 29, 2024, a concrete beam and launching gantry crane collapsed during construction of the Bang Khun Thian-Ban Phaeo elevated highway (Eka Chai-Ban Phaeo Section 1). This resulted in worker deaths and injuries.
These accidents led to the "containment" policy, aiming to prevent recurrence and enhance contractor safety standards. Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit announced the expedited development of a "pocketbook" outlining penalties for contractors and concessionaires who endanger the public. These penalties could include demotion and disqualification from future project bids.
The Ministry acknowledges public concern regarding holding contractors accountable. Currently, contracts only include fines, limiting the government's actions. This has proven ineffective as contractors often disregard fines. The "pocketbook" aims to address this by introducing stricter standards.
However, creating this "pocketbook" and implementing blacklisting falls under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller General's Department within the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Transport is collaborating with the Ministry of Finance to establish these penalty guidelines. The Department of Highways, the Department of Rural Roads, and other relevant agencies are compiling information on issues and potential penalties for discussion with the Comptroller General's Department. Clearer procedures are expected in 2025.
## High-Speed Train Linking 3 Airports: Are We Sure We Won't End Up with a 100 Billion Baht Penalty?
Natethip 2025-01-03 04:40:38
One of the key investment projects of the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) is the high-speed train project linking 3 airports (Don Mueang - Suvarnabhumi - U-Tapao) worth over 224,544 million baht. It is undeniable that this project is approaching the final curve of its fate. Will it stay or go?
After more than 5 years have passed since the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) signed a contract with Asia Era One Company Limited of the CP Group on October 24, 2019, but until today there has been no progress.
What we see are only attempts to amend the concession agreement, amended so much that it barely resembles the original joint investment agreement that was bid on. The excuses given are the economic crisis, the COVID-19 situation, and the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War, all of which are considered "force majeure".
Yet, no other government investment projects have used these excuses to request contract amendments to this extent.
Many parties have sarcastically remarked to the EEC Office and the government that if the Thai government had disagreements with Cambodia over the sharing of benefits from undersea resources in the overlapping area around Koh Kut, and it dragged on for 5-10 years, would this issue be used to ask the government to relax or amend the concession agreement on other issues as well?
Recently, Mr. Pichet Chunnhavchira, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, as chairman of the Eastern Special Development Zone Policy Committee (EEC Committee), gave an interview to the media himself stating that the reasons for requesting to amend the contract, which are claimed to be "force majeure", are not considered force majeure, but merely a relaxation. This is because during the COVID-19 period, all sectors and the whole world experienced the same problems, whether it was travel disruptions or the global economic shutdown.
"This project does not have force majeure, but is merely a relaxation of the conditions in the contract. The contract stipulates payment conditions as installments over a period of 10 years, and the concessionaire will provide full financial documents as collateral."
Meanwhile, Mr. Wirot Amrapal, Governor of the SRT, stated after the Eastern Special Development Zone Policy Committee (EEC Committee) approved the principle of amending the concession agreement on this project in 5 issues earlier to push the project forward. However, until now, it has not been presented to the Cabinet for approval, resulting in delays and potentially affecting investment plans in other projects.
If in the end the government does not agree with the amendment of the concession agreement and orders the SRT to proceed with the project, the SRT is ready to carry out the construction itself, but will not operate the train if the contracting party "Asia Era One" is unable to proceed with the project.
After listening to the reasons of the SRT Governor and the EEC Committee Chairman, I wonder if Prime Minister Paethongtarn Shinawatra sees the irregularities hidden under the rug beneath the proposed amendment to the high-speed train concession agreement this time?
Why did the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) come out to object, stating that the approach to amending the concession agreement undermines the principle of public-private partnership and will only cause the government to lose benefits? In the future, it may also cause the government to face penalties.
The fact that the EEC Committee Chairman openly admitted that the reason for amending the project concession agreement is simply to allow this project to move forward because it is an important project of the EEC, and not due to force majeure arising from the economic crisis or COVID-19,
reflects that the attempt to amend this concession agreement will only invite trouble, and if problems arise in the future, the SRT and the government itself will inevitably be held responsible.
If the government does not agree with the contract amendment, the SRT itself says it is ready to carry out the project construction itself, as it has experience in constructing the Thai-Chinese railway (but the government must provide the construction budget, as the SRT will not be able to allocate the investment budget itself). So why allow the private sector to "catch a tiger with bare hands" from this cloud-cuckoo-land concession amendment?
Speaking of which, doesn't the SRT itself have consultants and advisory committees of all kinds already? Such as the legal and contract study working group chaired by Mr. Damrongsak Krukaew, and the working group to study and monitor problems in the railway project chaired by Mr. Pisit Leelavachirophas, former Auditor General.
So why not submit the matter of amending the high-speed train project linking 3 airports to both working groups for thorough analysis to determine whether the amendments made previously and those currently underway undermine the principle of joint investment and cause the government to lose benefits? Does the EEC Office and the EEC Committee have the authority to proceed on their own?
It's no surprise then why in the case of encroachment on "Khao Kra Dong" land in Buriram province, even though the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that it was the SRT's land since time immemorial, it has not been able to enforce the law decisively. Until now, it has not been able to push influential businessmen or politicians out of the area.
So how can the Thai people be confident that the amendment to the high-speed train concession agreement linking 3 airports, which is currently being pursued in this unrealistic manner, will benefit the government and not cause the government to lose benefits or face penalties later on? Is it true or not!!!
## High-Speed Rail Linking 3 Airports: A Delayed Decision
**The high-speed rail project connecting 3 airports, worth 224.544 billion baht, is already 5 years behind schedule.**
The contract amendment, which was supposed to be finalized by the end of 2024, has been delayed and has not yet been submitted to the Cabinet for approval. This delay is causing the nation to lose valuable opportunities for development in the EEC area, including the U-Tapao airport and aviation city, as well as investment along the rail line.
If the contract amendment with the CP Group continues to stall, the government must explore alternative options. These options include re-bidding the project or having the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) undertake the construction itself, with an estimated budget of 120 billion baht, and then seeking a private operator for the train service.
**The Yingluck government needs to make a decisive decision on how to proceed.**
1. **Even if the Cabinet approves the new contract draft and the SRT and CP Group sign and commence construction, it will take more than 5 years for the project to be completed and operational.**
The high-speed train is unlikely to be running before 2030. This delay will impact many related projects, as this is one of the four EEC Project Lists under the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) investment model.
According to the original plan, the train should have been operational in 2024. Who is responsible for the lost opportunities, including the development of cities and stations in Chachoengsao, Sriracha, and Sattahip, as well as the U-Tapao Airport and the Eastern Aviation City? The high-speed rail line was planned to be built as an underpass connecting to the airport, with the airport's second runway built above it. This delay has also halted the construction of the second runway.
In the future, winners of other affected projects may seek compensation for delays caused by the 3-airport rail link.
2. **The three parties involved - the SRT, Asia Era One Company (CP Group), and the Eastern Special Development Zone Policy Committee (EEC) - have been working to amend the contract in 5 key areas:**
(1) **Payment method for the Public Investment Cost (PIC):** Originally, the government would pay after the private sector started operating the high-speed train. The payment would be spread over 10 years in equal annual installments, totaling 149.65 billion baht. This has been changed to payments in installments based on the progress of construction as inspected by the SRT, with a total amount not exceeding 120 billion baht. However, Asia Era One is required to provide additional security from the original contract, totaling 160 billion baht, to guarantee that the construction and high-speed train will be operational within 5 years. Ownership of the structures will be transferred to the SRT immediately according to each payment installment.
(2) **Payment schedule for the right to co-invest in the Airport Rail Link (ARL) project:** Asia Era One will pay the 10.671 billion baht fee in 7 equal annual installments. The first installment must be paid on the date of signing the amended contract with the SRT. The company must also provide a bank guarantee for the ARL fee and other financial expenses borne by the SRT.
(3) **Additional Revenue Sharing:** If the project's loan interest rate decreases significantly in the future, resulting in Asia Era One's Internal Rate of Return (IRR) exceeding 5.52%, the SRT has the "right" to request the company to pay additional revenue sharing as agreed upon later.
(4) **"Exemption" from the Notice to Proceed (NTP) condition:** This allows the SRT to issue the NTP to Asia Era One immediately after both parties sign the amended contract.
(5) **Preventing future problems that may arise from events that severely impact the project's financial status:** This involves amending the "force majeure" and "relief events" clauses to align with other public-private partnership contracts.
These 5 amendments are awaiting Cabinet consideration.
3. **From the private sector's perspective, complying with the amended conditions also presents additional burdens.**
They will need to discuss the 5 amendments with the banks financing the project. The banks, providing 200 billion baht in funding, are reportedly concerned about the increased risks of the project, the significantly higher construction costs leading to lower estimated returns on investment, the reduced return on investment from the Makkasan area development, the potential decrease in passenger numbers, and the higher interest rate trend compared to initial projections.
Importantly, the proposed contract amendments require the private sector to provide security totaling over 300 billion baht. This includes a 4.5 billion baht performance bond for the 50-year contract, a 160 billion baht shareholder guarantee for the 50-year contract, a 120 billion baht construction guarantee, a 16 billion baht system work guarantee, a 750 million baht 10-year operational quality guarantee, and a 9.147 billion baht guarantee for the ARL fee and remaining first installment payment (456.9 million baht), with 6 additional guarantees required for the latter, each worth 1.524 billion baht.
4. **This project has been continuously delayed since the Prayut government.**
The government was unable to deliver the land to the private sector, and the private sector was unable to proceed. This mutual inability to fulfill the original contract conditions necessitates a review, as this is a national strategic project.
Without amending the contract, the project will likely be stalled indefinitely. Ultimately, the impact will be felt by both the private sector and the nation as a whole, creating a ripple effect on other projects in the EEC. Lengthy lawsuits and claims for damages are also likely.
The key issue is that this contract amendment involves significant changes to the project's financial terms, deviating from the original bidding conditions. This could be unfair to other bidders who lost under the original conditions. Therefore, careful consideration is needed, including review by the Attorney General and relevant agencies.
This is to avoid repeating past mistakes where contract amendments after bidding were deemed unlawful, leading to legal action and imprisonment of those involved.
**It is time for the Yingluck government to make a decisive decision and push for a resolution. Continuing this indecision is a disservice to the nation and its potential for progress.**
The video is about the construction of the high-speed rail line passing through Thammasat University, Rangsit Center.
The construction started in December 2024 and is expected to be completed in 2025.
The project is currently 1.45% complete and is expected to be completed by 2025.
The video also provides a brief overview of the project, including the length of the line, the cost of construction, and the names of the companies involved in the project.
The video also shows the construction site and provides updates on the progress of the project.
The video ends with a call to action, asking viewers to like, share, and comment on the video.
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